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The financial systems in emerging market economies during the 2008–09 global financial crisis performed much better 
than in previous crisis episodes, albeit with significant differences across regions. For example, real credit growth in 
Asia and Latin America was less affected than in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper identifies the factors at 
both the country and the bank levels that contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in Latin America during 
the global financial crisis. The resilience of real credit during the crisis was highly related to policies, measures and 
reforms implemented in the pre-crisis period. In particular, we find that the best explanatory variables were those that 
gauged the economy’s capacity to withstand an external financial shock. Key were balance sheet measures such as the 
economy’s overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short-term debt). The 
quality of pre-crisis credit growth mattered as much as its rate of expansion. Credit expansions that preserved healthy 
balance sheet measures (the “quality” dimension) proved to be more sustainable. Variables signalling the capacity to 
set countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies during the crisis were also important determinants. Moreover, financial 
soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity and bank efficiency, also played a 
role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks which had 
expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit most. The methodology used in this paper 
includes the construction of indicators of resilience of real credit growth to adverse external shocks in a large number 
of emerging markets, not just in Latin America. As additional data become available, these indicators could be part of 
a set of analytical tools to assess how emerging market economies are preparing themselves to cope with the adverse 
effects of global financial turbulence on real credit growth.
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Since  mid-2011,  uncertainties  in  the  global  economy  have  increased  significantly.  A 
combination  of unresolved  sovereign debt  problems  in  Europe  and  concerns  about  the 
lackluster behavior of the US economy have resulted in investors’ increased perception of 
risk and a flight to quality towards assets considered the safest, especially US Treasuries. In the 
current environment, the possibility of a deep adverse shock affecting world trade and global 
liquidity cannot be discarded. Indeed, for a large number of emerging market economies, 
including many in Latin America, the largest threat to their economic and financial stability 
comes from potential disruptive events in developed countries.  
The potential of a sharp and sustained decline in real credit growth stands out as a major 
concern  for  Latin  American  policymakers  if  a  new  international  financial  crisis  were  to 
materialize. The implications of a deep credit contraction for economic activity, financial 
stability and social progress are well known to Latin America in the light of its experience 
with financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s. Major external financial shocks, such as the oil 
crisis in the early 1980s and the Russian and East Asian crises in the 1990s, had severe and 
long-lasting financial impacts on the region. 
However, and departing from the past, Latin America’s good performance during the global 
crisis of 2008-09 set an important precedent about the region’s ability to cope with adverse 
external shocks. As is well known, the crisis presented a major challenge to the financial 
stability  and  period  of  sustained  growth  that  had  characterized  the  region  in  2004-07. 
Following  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  in  September  2008,  skepticism  about  the 
fortunes of Latin America ruled. This was not surprising given past events. But in contrast to 
previous  episodes,  while  the  external  financial  shock  of  2008  had  an  important  adverse 
impact on economic and financial variables in the region, these effects were short-lived. By 
early  2010,  many  Latin  American  countries  were  back  on  their  path  of  solid  economic 
growth, financial systems remained solvent, and real credit growth recovered rapidly. 
The main objective of this paper is to identify the factors at both the country and the bank 
levels that contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in Latin America during the 
global crisis. In doing so, we also aim at contribute to the construction of indicators that can 
be useful in assessing the degree of resilience of real credit growth to adverse external shocks 
in a large number of emerging markets, not just in Latin America.  
A central argument in this paper is that key factors explaining the behavior of real credit 
growth in emerging markets in general, and in Latin America in particular, during the crisis 
relate to policies, measures and reforms implemented before the crisis. Moreover, this paper 
argues that even the capacity to safely implement countercyclical policies to minimize credit 
contractions (such as the provision of central bank liquidity) during the crisis depended on 
the countries’ initial economic and financial strength. That is, consistent with Rojas-Suarez 
(2010), this paper argues that initial conditions mattered substantially in defining the financial 
path followed by Latin America and other emerging markets during and after the external  
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shock.1 The pre-crisis period is defined here as the year 2007. This was a relatively tranquil 
year in Latin America and other emerging market economies, in the sense that no major 
financial crises took place. 
To gain some understanding about the factors behind the behavior of real credit growth at 
the country (aggregate) level, we construct a number of indicators that can provide information 
about the resilience of real credit to a severe external financial shock. In identifying variables to 
form these indicators, a guiding principle was their relevance for emerging markets. Thus, 
the indicators include, among others, a number of variables that, while particularly important 
for the behavior of real credit in emerging markets, are not always pertinent for financial 
variables’ behavior in developed countries. The indicators considered covered three areas: 
macroeconomic  performance,  regulatory/institutional  strength  and  financial  system 
soundness.  
In calculating these indicators, we include not only Latin American countries but also a 
number  of  emerging  market  economies  from  Asia  and  Eastern  Europe.  Comparisons 
between regions of the developing world are extremely relevant since the impact of the 
financial crisis was quite different between regions. While real credit growth in Asia proved 
to be quite resilient to the international crisis, real credit growth in a number of Eastern 
European  countries  was  severely  affected.  Latin  American  lay  in  the  middle,  with  large 
disparities  in  the  behavior  of  real  credit  growth  between  countries  in  the  region.  The 
discussion in this paper allows for the identification of differences and similarities across 
emerging regions that led to particular outcomes.  
To deal with the behavior of real credit growth during the crisis at the bank level, we use 
bank-specific data to complement aggregate variables. The analysis here is restricted to Latin 
American  countries  due  to  the  lack  of  comparable  bank-level  information  from  other 
regions. However, in contrast to the country-level analysis, the availability of a sufficiently 
large data set for banks operating in Latin America allowed us to use econometric techniques 
to assess the relative importance of factors contributing to banks’ provision of credit during 
the crisis. The information derived from the analysis at the country level is used here to help 
identify the variables that enter the regression. A novel finding of the paper is that  the 
strength of some key macroeconomic variables at the onset of the crisis (in particular, a ratio of 
overall  currency  mismatches  and  alternative  measurements  of  external  indebtedness), 
together with variables that measure the capacity to set countercyclical policies during the 
crisis, explained banks’ provision of real credit growth during the crisis. We also found a 
positive impact of sound bank indicators on real credit. That is, banks with the highest ratios 
                                                       
1 Rojas-Suarez (2010), however, deals only with macroeconomic factors, while this paper tackles a number 
of other salient financial and structural characteristics of the countries as well as specific features of individual 
banks.   
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of capitalization and liquidity before the crisis experienced the lowest decline in real credit 
growth during the crisis. An additional result is that foreign banks and those with larger 
initial credit growth rates were, after controlling for other factors, the most affected during 
the crisis in terms of credit behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature 
on  determinants  of  real  credit  during  the  global  crisis  in  order  to  better  place  the 
contribution of this paper in that context. Section 3 provides basic data on the behavior of 
real credit growth in selected emerging market economies in the periods before, during and 
after the crisis. Section 4 constructs indicators of resilience of real credit growth to external 
financial shocks and applies them to selected countries in Latin America, Emerging Asia and 
Emerging Europe. The indicators are formed by the three categories of variables specified 
above,  measured  at  their  values  during  the  pre-crisis  period.  In  this  section  we  explore 
whether countries with lower values of the indicators during the pre-crisis period were also 
the countries where the provision of real credit was affected the most during the global 
crisis. This section also enables us to identify which specific variables of the indicators were 
most correlated to the behavior of real credit growth. Section 5 tackles the issues at the 
micro level by exploring bank-level information for a set of five Latin American countries. 
Informed by the results from the analysis in Section 4, econometric techniques are used to 
assess the relative importance of the alternative factors explaining the behavior of banks’ real 
credit growth during the global crisis. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Real credit growth in emerging markets during the global 
financial crisis: a brief literature review 
There is a growing literature on the effects of the global financial crisis in emerging market 
economies. Some of the existing research analyses the effects of pre-crisis conditions on the 
behavior of credit. To date, however, all of these studies have focused on analyzing country-
level information. In the same vein, Hawkins and Klau (2000) report on a set of indicators 
the BIS has been using since the late 1990s to assess vulnerability in the EMEs based on 
aggregate information. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that analyses the 
drivers of real credit growth during the crisis for some emerging market economies using 
bank-level information.  
Aisen and Franken (2010) analyze the performance of bank credit during the 2008 financial 
crisis using country-level information for a sample of over 80 countries. They find that larger 
bank  credit  booms  prior  to  the  crisis  and  lower  GDP  growth  of  trading  partners  were 
among the most important determinants of the post-crisis credit slowdown. They also find 
that countercyclical monetary and liquidity policy played a critical role in alleviating bank 
credit contraction. Moreover, Guo and Stepanyan (2011) find that domestic and foreign 
funding were among the most important determinants of the evolution of credit growth in 
emerging market economies during the last decade, covering both pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods.   
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Kamil and Rai (2010) analyze BIS data on international banks’ lending to Latin American 
countries and found that an important factor in Latin America’s credit resilience was its low 
dependence on external funding and high reliance on domestic deposits. Using similar data, 
Takáts (2010) analyses the key drivers of cross-border bank lending in emerging market 
economies between 1995 and 2009 and finds that factors affecting the supply of global credit 
were the main determinant of its slowdown during the crisis. 
In studies of other regions, Bakker and Gulde (2010) find that external factors were the main 
determinants of credit booms and busts in new EU members, but that policy failures also 
played a critical role. Also, Barajas et al (2010) find that bank-level fundamentals, such as 
bank capitalization and loan quality, explain the differences in credit growth across Middle 
Eastern and North African countries during the pre-crisis period. 
Some other studies have focused on the behavior of real GDP growth during the crisis in 
advanced and emerging market economies. For example, Cecchetti et al (2011) find that pre-
crisis policy decisions and institutional strength reduced the effects of the financial crisis on 
output growth. Similarly, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) find that the pre-crisis level of 
development, changes in the ratio of private credit to GDP, current account position and 
degree of trade openness were helpful in understanding the intensity of the crisis’ effect on 
economic  activity.  In  contrast,  Rose  and  Spiegel  (2011)  find  few  clear  reliable  pre-crisis 
indicators of the incidence of the crisis. Among them, countries with looser credit market 
regulations seemed to suffer more from the crisis in terms of output loss, whilst countries 
with lower income and current account surpluses seemed better insulated from the global 
slowdown.  
3. The behavior of real credit growth in emerging markets 
during the global financial crisis 
The analysis in this paper is based on a sample of 22 countries from three emerging market 
regions2. Countries were selected on the basis of availability of comparable information (not 
only on credit data, but also on the variables discussed in the nex t section). Countries from 
Latin America are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Emerging Asia  is: 
China, Chinese Taipei, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,  the  Philippines and Thailand. 
Finally,  Emerging  Europe  is:  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
                                                       
2   Economies like Hong Kong SAR and Singapore were not included in the sample because, as off-
shore  centres,  some  macroeconomic  indicators  of  real  credit  growth  resilience  have  different  relevance  in 




Graph 1: Real credit: growth and cycle by regions1 




1 Domestic bank credit to the private sector; deflated by CPI. 2 Annual changes; in per cent. 3 Gap from Hodrick-Prescott 
estimated trend (lambda = 1600). 4 Weighted average based on 2009 GDP and PPP exchange rates of the economies listed. 
5 Chinese Taipei, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 6 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. 
7 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS calculations. 
 
Graph 1 shows the evolution of real credit growth and the real credit cycle during the crisis 
by region for the emerging market economies in our sample. There are some characteristics 
that are important to highlight: (i) The behavior of real credit in China and Mexico differs 
from  those  in  the  other  countries  in  their  respective  regions.  In  particular,  real  credit 
expanded in China during the crisis while it decreased in the rest of Asia. In the case of 
Mexico, the recovery of real credit took longer than in the rest of the region. (ii) By the end 
of 2009, real credit growth and the real credit cycle experienced their lowest levels for most 
countries, with the exception of countries in  Emerging Europe and Mexico. (iii) In most 
countries, with the exception of China,  real credit displayed values below trend after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
Taking into account  the characteristics of the evolution of  real credit, the variable under 
analysis in the rest of this paper is defined as  the change in the year on year real credit 
growth rate between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2009.3 We consider 
                                                       
3   At the country level, we also considered the difference between the year on year real credit growth 
for the fourth quarter of 2009 and the third quarter of 2008 (since the year on year real credit growth peaked in 
Q3 2008 in most countries at the aggregate level). However, there were insufficient reliable data at the bank level to 
use this period of analysis. Thus, consistency between the aggregate and bank-level analyses was a key criterion 
for the selection of the period.  
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this fixed period because for most countries in our sample, credit conditions resumed to 
normality by 2010, as shown in Graph 1.4 The main advantage of this measurement is that it 
does not rely on the   use of a filter to de -trend the time series. However, i t is worth 
mentioning that this measure does not take into account the credit cycle position of each 
country. That is, it may be that a reduction in real credit growth could be a good thing, for 
example in  a credit boom.  Other caveats  are  that  the measurement  does not  take into 
account the duration of the fall in credit, nor control for the effects of other shocks (beyond 
the  crisis)  that  could  affect  credit .  for  example,  because  of  countercyclical  policies 
implemented earlier. 
Graph 2: Change in real credit growth during the crisis1 
In per cent 
 
AR = Argentina; BG = Bulgaria; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; EE = 
Estonia; HU = Hungary; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; LT = Lithuania; LV = Latvia; MX = Mexico; MY = 
Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; TH = Thailand; TW = Chinese Taipei. 
1 Difference in year over year percentage change for Q4 2009 and Q4 2007. 
Sources: IMF; Datastream; national data. 
 
Graph 2 (and Table A1 in Appendix II) presents the change in real credit growth during the 
crisis, calculated as explained above, in order of magnitude.5 The regional differences stand 
                                                       
4   However, this is not the case for countries in Emerging Europe. An alternative indicator would be 
the  difference  between  the  maximum  and  minimum  levels  of  real  credit  growth  around  the  post-Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy period. The indicator, however, does not take into account different durations of the effects 
of the crisis (thus, it does not penalise for longer durations of the crisis’ effects).  
5   Table A1 in Appendix II also standardizes the real credit growth variable (second column in the 
table) by subtracting the cross-country mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The standardised values will 
be highly useful in the next section when we compare the behavior of real credit growth to a number of other 
calculated variables. The last column of Table A1 presents the ranking of countries according to the behavior of 
real credit growth. The countries where real credit growth declined the most during the crisis occupy the lowest 
positions in the ranking.  
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out. Emerging Asia displays the lowest reductions in real credit growth during the crisis 
among the selected countries. Indeed, if we rank countries such that those where real credit 
growth declined the least occupy the highest positions in the ranking, the top nine positions 
in the ranking can be found in Emerging Asia. China and Chinese Taipei take the first two 
positions,  with  an  increase  in  real  credit  growth  due  to  a  strong  countercyclical  fiscal 
expansion in the former country and a close relationship between the two  countries. In 
contrast, the lowest positions in the ranking are occupied by countries in Emerging Europe. 
Latin American countries rank in the middle. 
Why was real credit growth in some countries more resilient than in others? We turn to that 
question in the next sections. 
4. Indicators of real credit growth resilience to external 
financial shocks in emerging markets: analysis at the 
aggregate level 
In  this  section  we  construct  three  indicators  at  the  country  level  signaling  the  relative 
capacity of financial systems to withstand the adverse effects of an external shock on real 
credit growth. In this sense these are financial resilience indicators. We claim that the financial 
systems of emerging market economies with the highest values of the resilience indicators 
during the pre-crisis period were best prepared to cope with the global financial crisis and were, 
therefore, relatively less affected in terms of the contraction of real credit growth during the 
crisis.6, 7 
The  indicators  cover  three   areas:  ( i)  macroeconomic  performance ;  (ii)  financial 
regulatory/supervisory quality;  and (iii) banking system soundness. Although many of the 
variables included in the indicators have been previously  utilized in the literature to assess 
financial systems’ strengths and vulnerabilities, our contribution regarding the construction 
of the indicators is twofold. First, the criterion used in the selection of variables was, first and foremost, 
their relevance for emerging markets. Second, and guided by the criterion above, we introduce a 
novel  variable  within  the  macroeconomic  indicator:  a  measurement  of  the  capacity  of 
monetary policy to react promptly to adverse external shocks without compromising domestic 
financial stability (see discussion below).  
Each of the indicators is constructed for the sample of 22 emerging market economies listed 
in the previous section. Since the indicators are examined at their values during the pre-crisis 
period, variables are calculated for 2007.  
                                                       
6   As discussed above, China and Chinese Taipei were exceptions in that their rates of growth of real 
credit during the crisis were higher than the rates observed during the pre-crisis period.   
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The  methodology  for  constructing  each  indicator  is  straightforward.  First,  to  make  the 
different variables within an indicator comparable, each variable is standardized, subtracting 
the cross-country mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Second, variables whose 
increase in value signals a reduction in financial strength (an increase in vulnerability) are 
multiplied  by  -1.  Finally,  the  indicator  is  simply  the  average  value  of  the  standardized 
variables.8 9. This methodology, of course, implies that we analyze relative financial resilience 
among countries in the sample. 
We now turn to the construction of each specific indicator. 
4.1. Macroeconomic performance 
As described in Section 2, there is a long list of macroeconomic variables that have been 
previously  identified  as  providing  useful  signals  of  financial  systems’  strengths  and 
vulnerabilities. To a significant extent, macro resilience translates into financial systems and, 
therefore, real credit growth resilience. 
Thus,  along  the  lines  of  this  paper,  the  variables  included  here  to  compose  the 
macroeconomic indicator have been chosen to potentially maximize the explanatory power 
of  the  evolution  of real  credit  growth  in  emerging  markets  in  the  presence  of  an  external 
financial shock.10  
From a macroeconomic point of view,  resilience can be described as having two dimensions: 
(i)  the  economy’s  capacity  to  withstand  the  impact  of  an  external  financial  shock  (and, 
therefore,  minimize  the  impact  on  the  provision  of  real  credit);  and  (ii)  the  authorities’ 
capacity to rapidly put in place policies to counteract the effects of the shock on the financial 
system (such as the provision of liquidity).  
                                                                                                                                                 
7   As has been well documented, an adverse shock that weakens the banking system will result in capital 
losses and credit growth contractions. 
8   As  shown  by  Stock  and  Watson  (2010),  a  common  explanatory  factor  (a  scalar  dynamic  factor 
model) can be estimated by the cross-sectional average of the variables when there is limited dependence across 
series. Accordingly, the cross-sectional average of standardised variables provides the estimation of a common 
explanatory factor when the variables involved have different variability; that is, when the error terms of the 
scalar dynamic factor model have heteroskedasticity, as shown below.  
9   Alternatively, we could have formed the indicator by adding the standardi sed variables (as in Gros 
and Mayer, 2010).  
10   Note that even if an external shock does not have a significantly large direct effect on banks’ funding 
conditions, there can be large second round effects on both the supply of and demand for credit by households and 
firms if the shock adversely affects real economic activity. This was the case in many emerging market economies 
during the crisis.  
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As is well known, different regions in the world follow different economic growth models. 
Thus, it is expected that the effects of an external financial shock on local financial systems 
will  differ  between  regions  (and  countries).  Fully  capturing  differences  between  growth 
models involves analyzing not only economic differences, but also large variations in social 
and political factors. This is a huge task, well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we 
focus on a single question that can capture key economic and financial differences between 
growth models: How are investment and growth financed? 
There are three major sources of financing investment and growth in emerging markets: 
foreign financial flows, export revenues and domestic savings.11 While all regions use these 
three sources, differences in their growth models imply that the degree of reliance on each of 
them differs sharply. For example, facing low domestic savings ratios and relatively low trade 
openness, Latin American countries rely relatively more on foreign financial flows as a 
financing mechanism  for growth  than Asian countries that display high  domestic savings 
ratios and  a high ratio of trade flows to GDP. Table  1 summarizes the reliance of the 
emerging market regions considered here on alternative sources of funding by presenting 
average indicators for financial openness, trade openness and savings ratios. 
As shown in Table 1, by 2007  – the pre-crisis year – Latin America was (and it still is) a 
highly financially open region in the developing sample, in the sense that it imposed few 
restrictions to the cross-border movements of capital. Indeed, excluding Argentina, the value 
of the index reached 1.6 (in an index whose value fluctuates between -2.5 (financially closed) 
and 2.5 (fully open financially). At the same time, Latin America is the least open region in 
terms of trade and displays an extremely low savings rate.  
Table 1: Financial openness, trade openness and savings ratios in emerging markets 










rates as percentage 
of GDP 
(average 2004-07) 
Latin America  1.16  48  25 
Emerging Asia  0.30  168  35 
Central/Eastern 
Europe  2.20  120  20 
1 Chinn and Ito (2008) index. The higher the value of the index, the lower the restrictions to cross-
border movements of capital. The value of the index fluctuates between -2.5 and 2.5. 
Sources: Chinn and Ito (2008); Rojas-Suarez (2010); World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
 
                                                       
11   See Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez (2004).  
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Emerging Asia stands opposite to Latin America in terms of these indicators. The Asian 
region is the least financially open among the regions considered, while it is the most open 
region  regarding  trade  transactions  and  shows  the  highest  national  savings  ratios.  The 
countries in the Central/Eastern Europe area are closer to Latin America than to Emerging 
Asia in their degree of financial openness and their very low savings ratio. In terms of trade 
openness, however, the region is closer to Emerging Asia. 
In what follows we explain how these (varying) features of emerging markets translate into a 
set of macroeconomic variables that provides signals of resilience with respect to external 
financial shocks.  
4.1.1.  The first dimension of resilience: the economy’s capacity to withstand an 
external financial shock  
As has been well documented in the literature,12 highly open financial economies tend to be 
very vulnerable to a sudden dry -up of external  funding. However, as the global fi nancial 
crisis demonstrated, economies that are highly open to trade are also quite vulnerable to the 
extent that trade finance is a key source of funding for this type of international transactions. 
In this regard, albeit with different degrees of intensity, all financial systems in the emerging market 
regions under consideration are quite vulnerable to external financial shocks.  
Thus,  at  the  macro  level,  following  a  sharp  and  adverse  external  financial  shock,  the 
destabilizing local economic and financial effects will depend on a country’s current external 
financing  needs  (a  flow  measure)  and  on  the  country’s  external  solvency  and  liquidity 
position (stock measures). The variables chosen in this paper as indicators of a country’s 
external position are: (a) the current account balance as a ratio of GDP; (b) the ratio of total 
external  debt  to  GDP;  (c)  the  ratio  of  short-term  external  debt  to  gross  international 
reserves; and (d) a measurement of currency mismatch proxied by the foreign currency share 
of total debt divided by the ratio of exports to GDP.  
(a) The current account balance as a ratio of GDP is a customary indicator of 
a country’s existing (at the time of the shock) external financing needs and represents the 
flow indicator. The other three indicators are intended to represent the country’s external 
solvency and liquidity stance.  
(b) The ratio of total external debt to GDP is used as an indicator of a country’s 
overall capacity to meet its external obligations (a solvency indicator). Under this concept, 
the aggregate of public and private debt is included.  
                                                       
12   See, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Edwards (2004), and Hawkins and Klau (2000).  
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(c)  The  ratio  of  short-term  external  debt  to  gross  international  reserves 
intends to capture the degree of a liquidity constraint. In the presence of a sharp adverse 
external shock, countries need to show that they have resources available to make good on 
payments due during the period following the shock. Proof of liquidity is particularly important 
for emerging market economies since they cannot issue hard currencies (i.e. currencies that are 
internationally traded in liquid markets). Lacking access to international financial markets at 
the time of the shock, large accumulations of foreign exchange reserves and limited amounts 
of  short-term  external  debt  serve  these  countries  well  in  maintaining  their  international 
creditworthiness and, therefore, minimizing the impact of the shock. Recognition of this source 
of vulnerability by authorities in many emerging market economies, especially in Asia and 
Latin America, has been reflected in the recently observed huge accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. Notice that this source of vulnerability does not depend on the exchange 
rate  regime.  Facing  a  sudden  stop  of  capital  inflows,  even  a  sharp  depreciation  of  the 
exchange rate cannot generate sufficient resources (through export revenues) fast enough to 
meet external amortizations and interest payments due. This explains why Latin American 
countries, since the mid-1990s, have increased the flexibility of their exchange rate regimes 
and do not follow purely flexible exchange rate systems.13 
(d) The foreign currency share in total debt as a ratio of exports to GDP14 is 
a measurement of currency mismatch initially proposed by Goldstein and Turner (2004). 
The central idea is that financing consumption or investment in non-tradable goods with 
foreign currency-denominated debt exposes debtors to solvency problems in the presence of 
a severe shock leading to a depreciation of the currency. This vulnerability takes a number of 
forms. For example, cross-border borrowing in foreign currency (by the public or private 
sector) to finance a local project using local inputs generates a currency mismatch. Local 
banks lending in foreign currency to firms or individuals whose earnings are in local currency 
is  another  source  of  a  currency  mismatch.  In  either  of  these  two  examples,  a  sharp 
depreciation of the local currency might severely impede the financial position of the debtor. 
In the first example, the returns generated by the project (in local currency) might not suffice 
to  cover  the  external  debt  in  foreign  currency.  In  the  second  example,  banks’  non-
performing  loans  might  increase  substantially  (therefore  deteriorating  banks’  solvency 
positions) as the local-currency earnings of borrowers might not be adequate to meet their 
foreign currency-denominated debt payments.  
Note that, similarly to the liquidity indicator previously discussed, the currency mismatch problem is an 
emerging  market  problem  since  these  countries  cannot  issue  hard  currency.  With  regard  to  the  first 
                                                       
13   See Rojas-Suarez (2010, 2003) for a full discussion of the restrictions on monetary/exchange rate 
policies in Latin America imposed by the volatility of capital inflows. 
14 The time series for this and other measures of currency mismatches for 27 countries are available on 
request from Bilyana.Bogdanova@bis.org  
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example above, developed countries have the option of issuing large amounts of external 
debt denominated in their own currencies.15 The second example is also not relevant for 
developed  countries  since  earnings  of  banks’  borrowers  are  also  denominated  in  hard 
currencies. 
4.1.2.  The second dimension of resilience: policymakers’ capacity to rapidly put 
in place policies to counteract the effects of the external shock  
For all practical purposes, and from a macroeconomic perspective, this basically means the 
authorities’ capacity to implement countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. Thus, the two 
variables include here concern the: (e) fiscal and (d) monetary positions. While the fiscal 
variable is straightforward, we propose here a new indicator of monetary policy stance. 
(e) The ratio of general government fiscal balance to GDP is the variable 
chosen here to represent a country’s fiscal position. We chose a broader concept of the fiscal 
stance because of significant differences in definitions and aggregations of fiscal accounts 
between countries. The argument put forward by this paper is that countries with strong 
fiscal positions before an external shock are better prepared to implement  countercyclical 
fiscal policies without further deteriorating the macroeconomic landscape affecting the local financial 
systems. In other words, while any government can technically increase expenditures and/or 
reduce  taxes  in  the  short  run,  only  those  with  a  sound  fiscal  stance  can  comfortably 
undertake these policies and maintain fiscal solvency. As an example, we can think of the 
active countercyclical role played by Banco del Estado, a public bank in Chile, during the 
crisis.  While  the  lending  activities  of  this  bank  contributed  to  deterioration  in  the 
consolidated fiscal stance and a large fiscal deficit in 2009, the Chilean authorities reversed 
the fiscal expansion after the crisis, and by 2011 Chile’s overall fiscal balance had returned to 
a surplus position. 
(f) The financial-pressures-adjusted monetary policy stance is the monetary 
variable used in this paper and, due to its novelty, requires a more extended explanation than 
the other macro variables considered. 
Monetary policy frameworks in emerging markets have put a lot of emphasis in the control 
of inflation. However, inflation under control and output close to its potential do not rule 
out the build-up of pressures that can destabilize financial markets, especially because these 
pressures are accumulated at longer horizons than those taken into account by traditional 
monetary policy frameworks.  
                                                       
15   It is important to clarify that the issue of currency mismatches in emerging markets remains valid 
even if these countries can issue some external debt denominated in their own currencies (as is the case of Mexico 
and Chile, for example). The problem is that the markets for this type of debt  are still highly illiquid and, 
therefore, highly volatile.   
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For this reason, we assess the monetary policy stance taking into account two factors: the 
“pure” monetary policy conditions and the degree of financial instability pressures. For the 
former we consider an interest gap, calculated as the deviation of the policy rate from a 
benchmark rate. For the latter we develop a simple signal of unsustainable credit growth; that 
is,  we  try  to  identify  the  potential  presence  of  a  credit  boom.  These  two  factors  are 
combined to obtain a financial-pressures-adjusted monetary policy stance. The indicator attaches a 
greater risk of financial instability to an expansionary monetary policy when it is taking place 
in the context of a credit boom.  
To calculate the interest gap, we estimate a benchmark rate based on a Taylor rule with 
interest rate smoothing.16 Therefore, a negative interest gap corresponds to an expansionary 
monetary policy stance. To assess the presence of a credit boom, we estimate a threshold on 
the  real  credit  growth  rate  above  which  th e  growth  of  real  credit  is  deemed  to  be 
unsustainable.  
The financial-pressures-adjusted monetary stance indicator is calculated as the  standardized 
version of the following:  
   
boom TR
t t t RC RC R R      
Where  t RC   is the growth rate of real credit, 
boom RC   is the threshold on credit growth 
for credit boom and 
TR
tt RR   is the interest rate gap. 
The  indicator  is  negative  when  either  a  signal  of  a  credit  boom  is  combined  with  an 
expansionary  monetary  policy  or  there  is  no  credit  boom  and  monetary  policy  is 
contractionary.  Positive  values  of  the  indicator  imply  that  either  monetary  policy  is 
expansionary but there is no signal of a credit boom or there is a credit boom but monetary 
policy  is  adjusting  (contractionary  policy  stance).  Its  limitations  notwithstanding,  this 
indicator  provides  a  first  approximation  for  assessing  how  well  positioned  (resilient)  a 
                                                       
16   The Taylor rule estimated has the following form: 




t Y Y R R R                   4 1 ) ( ) 1 ( , where  TR
t R  is the nominal benchmark rate at quarter t, 
n R  is the long term real interest rate,   is the inflation target level,  4  t is the inflation rate one year ahead and 
Y Yt  is the output gap calculated as the deviation of output with respect to its potential level. Lacking sufficient 
data for country differentiation, we use the same coefficients for all the countries: ρ=0.75, γπ=1.5 and γy=0.5. The 
coefficients for inflation and output gap are the same used by Taylor (1993) as benchmark. The long-term real 
interest rate is estimated as the average real ex-post interest rate for each country over the longest available period 
(which varies across countries). When no inflation target is available we use the average inflation level (over the 
same period used for estimating the long-term interest rate). We calculate the potential output using the HP 
(Hodrick-Prescott) filter.   
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country is in terms of its monetary policy to deal with an adverse external financial shock. 
For example, easy monetary policy in the context of a credit boom could fuel the boom 
further, weakening the financial system. This would expose financial fragilities, inducing a 
contraction in real credit growth, if an adverse external shock were to materialize. 
The threshold on the real credit growth rate for a credit boom is calculated as the median 
real credit growth rates for episodes of credit booms in Latin America and Emerging Asia, 
where credit booms are identified following the Mendoza and Terrones (2008) methodology. 
The resulting threshold equals 22%. Using a common threshold has the advantage that the 
measure does not rely on the use of a filter to de-trend the time series. However, it has the 
disadvantage that it does not take into account each country’s cyclical variability of credit.17 
We say that there is a signal of a credit boom if the rate of growth of real credit is above 22%. 
Graph  3  shows  separately  the  two  variables  that  form  the  financial-pressures-adjusted 
monetary stance variable for 2007, the year previous to the crisis. The vertical axis shows the 
pure monetary stance, i.e. the interest rate gap. The calculations show that in the pre-crisis 
period the policy stance in all countries in the sample was expansionary; that is, the policy 
rate implied by a Taylor rule was higher than the actual policy rates. In contrast, countries 
differed significantly regarding the behavior of real credit growth (horizontal axis). While 
there  were  no  signals  of  credit  booms  in  the  Asian  countries  in  the  sample,  there  was 
evidence of credit booms in several countries in Latin America and Emerging Europe. In 
particular, the growth rates of real credit in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania were above the 22% threshold.  
Countries that are further southeast in Graph 3 had larger negative values of the financial-
pressures-adjusted monetary stance variable, while countries in the southwest quadrant of 
the graph had a positive value of this indicator. As shown, the countries with larger negative 
values  of  the  financial-pressures-adjusted  monetary  stance  variable  were  those  in 
Eastern/Central  Europe.  For  example,  in  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  Romania  (the 
countries in the furthest southeast positions in the graph), very accommodative monetary 
policies  in  the  context  of  credit  booms  resulted  in  severe  fragilities  in  these  country’s 
financial  systems.  These  four  countries  also  experienced  sharp  reductions  in  real  credit 
growth during the crisis.18 The situation in Latin America was mixed. While monetary policy 
was not as expansionary as in most countries in Emerging Europe, our methodology 
indicates the presence of credit booms in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, which increased 
the vulnerability of these countries ’ financial systems to an external shock. On an overall 
basis,  Chile,  followed  by  Peru,  was  the  country  within  Latin  America  best  positioned 
according to this indicator. Emerging Asia was the least vulnerable region according to the 
                                                       
17   Further research is needed to compare alternative measures of the credit boom indicator. 
18  Hungary is a notable exception among countries in Emerging Europe.  
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variable, with Chinese Taipei, Philippines and Thailand standing out for their strength. Table 
A2 in Appendix II presents the actual values of the financial-pressures-adjusted monetary 
policy variable and its components. 
 
Graph 3: Financial-pressures-adjusted monetary policy stance 
In per cent 
 
AR = Argentina; BG = Bulgaria; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; EE = 
Estonia; HU = Hungary; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; LT = Lithuania; LV = Latvia; MX = Mexico; MY = 
Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; TH = Thailand; TW = Chinese Taipei. 
1 For 2007; based on quarterly data. 
Sources: IMF; Datastream; national data. 
 
4.1.3.  The values of the macroeconomic indicator and its components  
Table 2 presents the values of the six variables discussed above ((a) to (f)) and the aggregate 
macroeconomic indicator, constructed following the methodology described above. Note 
that the values of the variables – total external debt to GDP, short-term external debt to 
gross international reserves and the mismatch ratio – have been multiplied by (-1) since the 
larger the values, the lower the contribution of these variables to sound macroeconomic 
performance.  
How  were  emerging  market  economies  positioned  with  regard  to  the  macroeconomic 
indicator and its components? The last column of the table shows the countries’ relative 
position according to the value of the indicator. For example, China ranks 1st among the 
countries in the sample and Latvia last (in the 22th position). 
Not surprisingly, a number of countries in Emerging Europe were very badly positioned to 
face an unexpected external shock. A variety of factors, especially unrealistic expectations of 
a speedy entrance into the euro area (and the associated expected reduction in exchange rate 
risk and expected increase in net worth) led to excessive risk taking by both the public and 
private  sectors.  This  translated  into  excessively  high  indebtedness  ratios,  huge  and  
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unwarranted  reliance  on  short-term  external  debt,  and  unsustainable  fiscal  and  current 
account deficits.  
At the regional level, the pre-crisis situation in Emerging Asia and Latin America contrasted 
with that of Eastern Europe. For example, debt ratios (including both total and short-term 
external debt) were much smaller in the former regions than in the latter. Moreover, while all 
European countries in the sample displayed current account deficits (and many in the double 
digits),  the  large  majority  of  Asian  and  Latin  American  countries  experienced  current 
account surpluses. With plenty foreign exchange reserves (as a ratio of short-term external 
liabilities)  and  well  contained  external  financing  needs,  most  of  the  Asian  and  Latin 
American countries were well positioned to show financial resilience to the external shock of 
2008. Specifically, given the solid external positions in these two regions, the shock did not 
raise significant concerns about these countries’ capacity to meet their external obligations. 
As such, authorities were able to undertake countercyclical policies. 
Among Latin American countries, Chile, followed by Peru, was the best positioned in terms 
of its fiscal and monetary stance. Indeed, authorities in these two countries were able not 
only to undertake countercyclical fiscal and monetary expansions during the shock but also 
to quickly reverse the expansion once the worst of the crisis was over. As of mid-2011, these 
two countries were once again strong enough to deal with a new unexpected shock.  
The  countries’  ranking  position  in  the  macroeconomic  indicator  is  consistent  with  the 
discussion above. Most of the strongest positions are held by Asian countries, with Chile 
(ranking 2nd) joining the group of the most resilient countries. In contrast, the six lowest 
positions  in  the  ranking  are  occupied  by  Emerging  European  countries,  with  Argentina 
(ranking 16th) closer to the weakest performers.19 
It is interesting to note the role that limited trade openness plays in determining the relative 
position of Latin American countries in the macroeconomic indica tor. By construction, the 
lower the ratio of exports to GDP, the higher the mismatch ratio. T his partly explains the 
relatively high mismatch ratios in a number of Latin American countries. In other words, the 
resilience of Latin American countries to external financial shocks could benefit from efforts 
to increase the region’s degree of trade openness. 
 
                                                       
19   Argentina displayed the weakest ratios of debt and currency mismatch among Latin American 
countries in 2007.  
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Table 2: Macroeconomic performance: variables and indicators 







debt / GDP (-
1) 
Short-term 




















Latin America                 
Argentina  -47.5  -75.2  -148.0  2.3  -2.1  -7.5  -0.4  16 
Brazil  -16.0  -27.5  -58.6  0.1  -2.6  -20.5  0.2  13 
Chile  -35.4  -65.7  -46.8  4.5  8.4  46.3  0.8  2 
Colombia   -21.5  -26.4  -113.2  -2.8  -1.0  -6.6  0.0  14 
Mexico  -18.7  -29.5  -50.2  -0.8  -1.3  4.2  0.3  9 
Peru  -30.8  -28.9  -108.2  1.3  3.2  20.1  0.3  7 
Emerging Asia                  
China  -11.1  -17.6  -6.5  10.6  0.9  39.6  0.9  1 
Chinese Taipei  -24.0  -31.3  -10.6  8.9  -1.4  73.1  0.7  3 
India  -19.0  -20.9  -44.5  -0.7  -4.0  2.8  0.2  12 
Indonesia  -31.8  -38.1  -57.3  2.4  -1.2  35.3  0.3  8 
Korea  -37.9  -63.5  -23.5  0.6  4.2  3.9  0.5  6 
Malaysia  -30.5  -17.3  -12.8  15.9  -2.6  26.5  0.6  5 
Philippines  -46.0  -39.4  -67.8  4.9  -1.5  55.6  0.3  10 
Thailand  -30.1  -46.3  -9.5  6.3  0.2  54.8  0.7  4 
Emerging Europe                 
Bulgaria  -94.3  -105.0  -64.3  -26.9  3.5  -95.7  -0.7  18 
Czech Republic  -43.6  -72.7  -22.9  -3.3  -0.7  11.9  0.2  11 
Estonia  -108.4  -248.3  -58.3  -17.2  2.9  -70.6  -0.8  20 
Hungary  -103.1  -134.5  -40.6  -6.5  -5.0  106.6  -0.4  17 
Latvia  -127.6  -342.7  -102.2  -22.3  0.6  -187.3  -1.8  22 
Lithuania  -71.9  -121.5  -87.4  -14.6  -1.0  -88.2  -0.7  19 
Poland  -48.4  -112.1  -47.3  -4.8  -1.9  -17.5  -0.2  15 
Romania  -51.0  -80.7  -143.6  -13.4  -3.1  -198.1  -1.1  21 
                 
Correlation with 
credit growth4  0.45  0.38  0.71  0.76  0.05  0.73  0.75   
1 2007 data; in per cent. 2 Foreign currency share of total debt divided by the ratio of exports to GDP. 3 Average of the standardized version of the variables 
shown. 4 Difference in year on year percentage change for Q4 2009 and Q4 2007. 
Sources: IMF; Datastream; Moody’s; national data; BIS.  
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4.2. Regulatory/institutional strength 
In the years  previous to  the  crisis,  a number of emerging market economies had made 
significant progress in improving their financial regulatory and supervisory frameworks. The 
severe financial crises of the 1990s and early 2000s that affected Asian and Latin American 
countries, in particular, were a major factor conducive to strengthening rules and regulations 
governing  the  functioning  of  the  financial  system.  The  conjecture,  of  course,  is  that 
countries  with  stronger  regulatory  and  supervisory  frameworks  are  better  prepared  to 
withstand adverse shocks to the local financial systems and, therefore, to the provision of 
credit. 
Cross-country  comparable  data  on  the  quality  of  regulation/supervision,  however,  are 
lacking. Although the country coverage of the IMF’s comprehensive analysis of a country’s 
financial sector through the FSAPs (Financial System Analysis Program) has been increasing, 
many of the country reports are not published.20 Moreover, among the published reports, 
presentation of the assessments makes cross -country comparisons extremely difficult in 
many cases. Thus, while the trend in information provision in this area is positive, it was not 
adequate at the time of this writing. 
To date, the most comprehensive cross -country survey on financial regulation/supervision 
issues is the one originally designed by Barth et al (2006) and regularly updated by the World 
Bank, most recently in 2007, the pre -crisis year.21  The survey respondents are  country 
authorities.  Because of existing imperfections with the data set   (most importantly with 
interpretation problems in answering some of the survey questions), in this paper we have 
selected a few representative variables from the survey’s questions that are straightforward to 
answer (to minimize the interpretation problem). These variables cover two key areas of the 
regulatory framework. The first area relates to the regulatory permissiveness regarding banks’ 
involvement in fee-based bank activities (such as securities, insurance and real state); that is, 
activities beyond the traditional deposit taking/lending operations. The second area relates 
to the quality of accounting procedures and transparency of banks’ financial statements.  
The construction of these variables from the Barth et al survey is described in Appendix I. 
Each variable has been re-scaled in such a way that their values fluctuate between 0 and 1. 
The first two columns of Table 3 show the resulting re-scaled values for the countries in our 
                                                       
20   FSAPs are undertaken on a voluntary basis. Under current arrangements, publication of the 
assessment results remains at the discretion of each country’s authorities. 





sample.  In  that  table,  column  3  averages  the  scorings  to  obtain  a  broad  indicator  of 
regulatory quality.22 
Table 3: Regulatory/institutional strength: variables and indicators 
  Variables1 
Indicator3  Country 
ranking 















Latin America             
Argentina  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  -1.1  20 
Brazil  0.4  0.8  0.6  0.5  -1.0  19 
Chile  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.8  1.3  3 
Colombia   0.8  0.8  0.8  0.5  0.1  9 
Mexico  0.1  0.8  0.4  0.5  -1.6  21 
Peru  0.9  0.6  0.8  0.4  -0.8  18 
Emerging Asia              
China  0.9  0.4  0.7  0.5  -0.5  14 
Chinese Taipei  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.7  1.8  1 
India  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.5  -0.4  13 
Indonesia  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.4  0.0  12 
Korea  0.4  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.4  8 
Malaysia  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.7  1.7  2 
Philippines  0.3  1.0  0.6  0.5  -0.7  17 
Thailand  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.6  0.8  6 
Emerging 
Europe             
Bulgaria  0.5  0.8  0.7  0.5  -0.6  15 
Czech Republic  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  7 
Estonia  0.3  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.0  10 
Hungary  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.7  1.1  4 
Latvia  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.0  11 
Lithuania  0.6  1.0  0.8  0.7  1.0  5 
Poland  0.3  0.8  0.6  0.6  -0.7  16 
Romania  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.5  -1.6  22 
             
1 All variables adjusted to be in 0-1 range. 2 Average of “overall activities” and “accounting and transparency”. 3 
Standardized version of the “aggregate scoring” adjusted by “Government effectiveness”. 
Sources: Barth et al (2006); http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
 
                                                       
22   Given existing data, the variables presented for this indicator correspond to the pre-crisis 
year 2007.  
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As with the macroeconomic indicators, it is important to incorporate here features that are 
particularly  relevant  for  emerging  markets.  In  this  case,  consideration  of  the  quality  of 
institutions,  which  varies  significantly  among  emerging  market  economies,  is  highly 
pertinent. As is widely recognized, notwithstanding the quality of the regulatory framework, 
a country’s institutional strength is determinant in ensuring the enforcement of rules and 
regulations. For example, countries with weak institutions may experience severe political 
interference  during  times  of  difficulties  in  the  banking  system  that  will  prevent  an 
appropriate implementation of banking laws. 
 
To correct for the above problem, the aggregate scoring in column 3 is multiplied by a well- 
known measurement of institutional quality: the Government Effectiveness component of the 
World Bank Governance Indicators. This measurement is designed to “captur[e] perceptions of 
the  quality  of  public  services,  the  quality  of  the  civil  service  and  the  degree  of  its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al, 
2010). Column 4 in the table presents the values of the Government Effectiveness variable 
for 2007, re-scaled so that these values fluctuate between 0 and 1. Column 5 multiplies 
columns  3  and  4  and  applies  the  standardization  procedures  followed  in  this  paper  to 
produce the regulatory/institutional strength indicator. The relative position of each country 
with respect to this indicator is presented in the last column. 
In contrast to the macroeconomic indicators discussed above, a number of the countries in 
Emerging Europe obtain relatively high rankings among emerging markets (Romania is one 
of the exceptions). This result signals that the deep financial problems experienced by many 
countries in this region during the crisis cannot be attributed (at least not to a large extent) to 
deficiencies in compliance with regulatory standards or severe institutional weaknesses. The 
results for Asia are quite mixed, and it is not possible to make an assessment for the region 
as a whole. While the best two positions in the ranking are held by Chinese Taipei and 
Malaysia, the Philippines is close to the bottom of the ranking. The Latin American situation 
is somewhat less diverse since most of the countries in the region occupy very low positions 
in the ranking. Chile is the notable exception, since it ranks close to the Emerging European 
countries. 
Among the three groups of indicators constructed in this paper, the regulatory/institutional 
indicator is the most subjective one. This indicator is based on survey data and is subject to 
interpretation in answering survey questions. Not surprisingly, as will be discussed below, 
this indicator is the least correlated with the behavior of real credit growth during the crisis. 
4.3. Financial soundness 
A characteristic of most financial systems in emerging market economies is that they are 
bank-dominated.  Capital  market  development  is  generally  low  relative  to  developed  
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countries, although there are some exceptions, including Brazil. In this context, assessing the 
financial soundness of banks provides, in general, a good evaluation of the strength of the 
overall financial system and, therefore, the resilience of real credit growth in the presence of 
an adverse external shock.  
To construct the indicator of financial soundness we include four variables. The first is a 
capitalization ratio. Ideally, we would have liked to use the ratio of bank capital to risk-
weighted assets. However, given the large country variation in accounting methodologies, 
including  procedures  for  risk  assessment,  we  decided  to  use  the  simplest  and  most 
straightforward ratio: the capital to assets ratio.  
The second and third variables relate to the banking system liquidity position and are guided 
by the Basel III recommendations on stable funding.23 These variables are the ratio of bank 
deposits to bank credit and the ratio of short -term international bank claims to domestic 
credit to the private sector. The idea is that real credit growth will be less affected by adverse 
external financial shocks the higher the proportion of credit financed with domestic deposits 
and the lower the proportion of credit financed by short -term international claims (which 
tend to be a more volatile source of funding).  
The last variable included in the indicator of financial soundness is a commonly used ratio of 
banking system efficiency: the ratio of non-interest expenses to gross income.  
Following our procedure to construct the indicators, the  ratio of short-term international 
claims to domestic credit and  the ratio of non -interest  expenses to gross income  were 
multiplied by -1 since larger values of these two values reduce the overall res ilience of the 
financial system and, therefore, adversely affect real credit growth. 
The financial soundness indicator and the variables used to co nstruct it are presented in 
Table 4. Regional conclusions are similar to those for the macroeconomic indicator: The 
lowest positions in the ranking are  held by Emerging Europe and (most of) the highest by 
Asian countries. However, most Latin American count ries are better positioned in this  
indicator than in the macroeconomic indicator, with Brazil ranking 2nd among all countries 
in the sample.  
To a significant extent, the relative weaknesses of Emerging European countries  was due to 
banks’ high dependence on external sources of funding and relatively low funding through 
local deposits. For example, in Latvia’s banking system, deposits funded only 42% of credit, 
while the ratio of deposits to credit was around 200% in the Philippines. Moreover, while 
the ratio of short-term international bank claims to domestic credit to the private sector 
                                                       
23   Cecchetti et al (2011) follow a similar criterion in the selection of bank liquidity variables relevant to 
the behavior of real economic growth.  
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averaged 35% in Emerging Europe, this ratio averaged only 19% in Latin America and 12% 
in Emerging Asia. 
Table 4: Financial soundness: variables and indicators 
  Variables1 


















bank claims / 
domestic credit 
to the private 
sector (-1) 
Latin America             
Argentina  13.7  -67.6  161.6  -32.8  0.3  8 
Brazil  11.3  -58.6  138.7  -8.7  0.5  2 
Chile  7.1  -48.6  73.1  -13.7  -0.1  15 
Colombia   12.9  -51.8  53.2  -14.1  0.3  7 
Mexico  9.6  -52.6  123.1  -13.7  0.3  6 
Peru  8.8  -51.8  122.1  -32.8  0.0  11 
Emerging Asia                
China  5.7  -37.4  125.6  -3.0  0.6  1 
Chinese Taipei  6.1  -54.3  80.0  -5.6  -0.3  17 
India  6.4  -58.1  134.3  -12.2  -0.1  14 
Indonesia  10.2  -53.5  147.1  -25.7  0.4  5 
Korea  9.0  -47.8  59.4  -11.3  0.1  10 
Malaysia  7.4  -40.6  110.3  -10.5  0.5  4 
Philippines  11.7  -63.9  196.5  -26.2  0.5  3 
Thailand  9.8  -60.3  106.1  -4.4  0.1  9 
Emerging 
Europe         
 
   
Bulgaria  7.7  -51.7  93.2  -35.1  -0.3  19 
Czech Republic  5.7  -50.8  134.1  -20.4  -0.1  13 
Estonia  8.6  -40.7  48.6  -26.7  0.0  12 
Hungary  8.2  -59.3  75.0  -29.1  -0.5  20 
Latvia  7.9  -48.7  41.8  -39.2  -0.6  21 
Lithuania  7.9  -51.1  61.1  -20.9  -0.3  18 
Poland  8.0  -59.6  104.2  -14.9  -0.2  16 
Romania  10.7  -60.6  87.5  -93.9  -1.1  22 
             
1 2007 data; in per cent. 2 Standardized version of the average of the variables shown. 
Sources: IMF; Bankscope; national data. 
 
4.4. An overall resilience indicator 
For the sake of completeness, we construct an overall resilience indicator, which simply consists 
in  averaging  the  values  of  the  three  indicators  discussed  above.  The  indicator  and  its 
components are presented in Table 5.  
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Latin America           
Argentina  -0.4  0.3  -1.1  -0.40  19 
Brazil  0.2  0.5  -1.0  -0.11  14 
Chile  0.8  -0.1  1.3  0.67  3 
Colombia   0.0  0.3  0.1  0.12  9 
Mexico  0.3  0.3  -1.6  -0.31  17 
Peru  0.3  0.0  -0.8  -0.17  15 
Emerging Asia             
China  0.9  0.6  -0.5  0.34  6 
Chinese Taipei  0.7  -0.3  1.8  0.74  2 
India  0.2  -0.1  -0.4  -0.10  13 
Indonesia  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.21  8 
Korea  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.35  5 
Malaysia  0.6  0.5  1.7  0.92  1 
Philippines  0.3  0.5  -0.7  0.01  11 
Thailand  0.7  0.1  0.8  0.55  4 
Emerging 
Europe           
Bulgaria  -0.7  -0.3  -0.6  -0.54  20 
Czech Republic  0.2  -0.1  0.8  0.33  7 
Estonia  -0.8  0.0  0.0  -0.28  16 
Hungary  -0.4  -0.5  1.1  0.05  10 
Latvia  -1.8  -0.6  0.0  -0.77  21 
Lithuania  -0.7  -0.3  1.0  0.00  12 
Poland  -0.2  -0.2  -0.7  -0.35  18 
Romania  -1.1  -1.1  -1.6  -1.25  22 
           
Correlation 
with credit 
growth2  0.75  0.55  0.35  0.71   
See previous tables for definitions of the variables. 
1 Simple average of the indicators shown. 2 Difference in year on year percentage change for Q4 
2009 and Q4 2007. 
Sources: IMF; UN; Bankscope; Datastream; Moody’s; national data; BIS. 
 
The last column of Table 5 shows the ranking of the countries. Not surprisingly, according 
to this overall indicator, before the crisis, Emerging Asia was the region best prepared (most 
resilient) to minimize the adverse effects of an external shock on real credit growth. Indeed, 
from this region, Malaysia, Chinese Taipei and Thailand are within the first four positions in 
the ranking. Likewise, Emerging Europe was the least resilient region. The last two positions 
in the ranking (Romania and Latvia) are in this region . With the exception of Argentina,  
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which ranks very low, and Chile, which ranks third, the rest of the Latin American countries 
are positioned in the middle of the ranking. 
4.5. Putting the indicators to work: how did they correlate with real credit 
growth during the global financial crisis? 
We  can now move  on  to tackling the  questions posed in  this paper:  Did the  pre-crisis 
indicators constructed in this section matter for the behavior of real credit growth during the 
crisis, and were some indicators more relevant than others? Ideally, we would like to address 
these questions using econometric techniques (as we will do in the next section using bank-
level data). However, at the aggregate level, with 22 countries in our sample, there are no 
sufficient data points for any meaningful application of cross-section econometric analysis. 
Thus, at the aggregate level, we simply rely on calculating partial correlations. While no 
causality can be derived from these correlations, we find them extremely useful for two 
reasons. The first is that, as a first approximation, the exercise allows recognition of the 
factors that were associated with the behavior of real credit growth during the crisis. Thus, it 
can guide policymakers in emerging markets regarding the key factors that need to be in 
place to minimize the impact of an adverse external shock on real credit growth. The second 
reason is that this exercise helps to identify the most relevant indicators (variables) to be 
included in the econometric estimation of the equation explaining the behavior of real credit 
growth at the bank level. 
The last row in Table 5 presents the correlations between the alternative indicators presented 
in this section and the growth of real credit during the crisis (as defined in Section 3 with 
data in Graph 2). With a value of 0.7, the correlation between the overall resilience indicator 
and  real  credit  growth  is,  indeed,  high.  Among  the  more  specific  indicators,  the 
macroeconomic  indicator  stands  out  as  having  the  highest  correlation  with  real  credit 
growth, followed by the indicator of financial soundness.  
The correlation coefficient associated with the indicator of regulatory/institutional strength 
is the lowest among the indicators (0.35). There are several explanations for this outcome. 
First,  in  contrast  to  the  macro  performance  and  financial  soundness  indicators,  the 
regulatory/institutional indicator is better suited to explain long-term trends than short-term 
credit behavior associated with an external shock. Second, the inclusion of variables within 
this indicator was limited to the availability of comparable data between countries in the 
sample; this might have left out some key regulatory variables associated with the behavior 
of real credit. Finally, as discussed above, the quality of the regulatory/institutional indicator 
is lower than the others because of the high content of subjective information. 
Among macroeconomic variables, the highest correlation coefficients (see last row of Table 
2) were found for  current account/GDP (0.76), the currency mismatch ratio (0.71) and 
financial-pressures-adjusted monetary policy stance (0.73). Thus, real credit growth resilience 
during  the  crisis  was  associated  with  the  countries’  external  financing  needs,  their  
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indebtedness in foreign currency relative to the size of their tradable sectors (exports/GDP), 
and the capacity of monetary policy to provide liquidity without generating macroeconomic 
instability. The correlation coefficients for all the other macroeconomic variables were also 
positive, but at significantly lower levels. 
The results so far are, therefore, indicative that initial conditions in the period before the crisis 
regarding macroeconomic performance and financial strength mattered for the behavior of 
real credit growth during the crisis. Moreover, the results support the premise in this paper 
that there are a number of variables particularly relevant for emerging market economies 
when facing adverse external financial shocks. As discussed above, some of these variables 
relate to the inability of emerging market economies to issue hard currency. As such, the 
importance  of  avoiding  large  currency  mismatches  is  particularly  important.  This  factor 
could  be  determinant  to  the  stability  of  financial  systems  if  an  adverse  shock  were  to 
materialize. 
To  strengthen  the  results  obtained  so  far,  the  next  section  turns  to  a  more  rigorous 
econometric analysis using bank-level data for the Latin American region.  
5. An econometric investigation on the behavior of real credit 
growth in Latin America during the crisis: analysis at the 
bank level 
This section complements the analysis conducted at the aggregate level by using bank-level 
data for the case of Latin America. The advantage of using data at the micro level is that now 
we  have  a  sufficiently  large  data  set  to  apply  econometric  techniques.  The  limitation, 
however, is that lacking comparable bank data across all countries discussed in the previous 
section, we restrict our analysis to the Latin American countries included in the sample: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  
5.1. Econometric strategy 
Continuing  with  the  main  theme  in  this  paper,  in  this  section  we  test  whether  initial 
conditions  regarding  country-specific  variables  (such  as  macroeconomic  conditions)  and 
bank-specific characteristics in the pre-crisis year (2007) help to explain the behavior of banks’ 
real  credit  growth  during  the  crisis.  Thus,  the  specification  of  the  benchmark  equation 
estimated is as follows: 
t t j i z t j i z t j x j t j i Z Z X Y             
2
1 , , 2
1
1 , , 1 1 , , , ,  
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The endogenous variable  i,j,t Y  is defined as the change in the annual real growth rate of 
banking institution i  in country  j between 2009 and 2007.24 The equation includes country 
dummies  j ()  and the following variables measured in 2007: country-specific variables such 
as macroeconomic variables  ,1 () jt X  , bank-specific financial soundness variables 
1
,1 () it Z  , 
and bank-specific controls. Initially we estimate this specification by ordinary least squares, 
and then we test and correct for heteroskedasticity and endogeneity of the regressors.
 
This econometric specification is in line with other studies that analyze the behavior of bank 
credit in emerging market economies, such as  Arena et al (2007) and Dages et al (2000). 
However, there are some differences with  respect to previous studies: (i) we focus on the 
determinants of the change of real credit growth during a particular crisis period, while other 
studies focus on the growth of real credit across different periods; (ii) ours is a cross-section 
analysis, while previous studies have performed panel regression analysis; and (iii) we focus 
on pre-determined macroeconomic fundamentals as sources of differences in  behavior of 
credit growth.  
Since we are dealing with cross-section analysis, it is not possible to simultaneously include 
several of the country-specific variables in the regression. Doing so would result in problems 
of multicolinearity. Thus, we guide our selection of aggregate variables  according to  the 
results obtained in the previous section. According to that analysis, the performance of a 
small number of macroeconomic variables  before  the  crisis  was  highly  correlated  with  the 
behavior of real credit growth during the crisis. We therefore include one of each of those 
variables  at  a  time  in  alternative  regressions.  That  is,  we  have  one  specification  of  the 
benchmark equation for each macroeconomic variable to be tested.  A limitation of this 
approach  is  that  we  cannot  test  for  the  effect  of  each  macroeconomic  variable  after 
controlling for the others.25  
A second group of variables shown in the previous section to be  highly correlated with the 
change in  real credit  growth was formed by the components of the  financial soundness 
indicator. We include these variables in the regression taking advantage of the availability of 
data at the bank   level. The financial soundness variables included were capitali zation, 
liquidity and efficiency ratios. Among other bank-specific controls, we include the real credit 
                                                       
24   We choose to compare the annual 2009 real growth rate of credit with that of 2007 because quarterly 
data availability was limited and information for 2008 already takes into account some of the effects of the crisis. 
In addition, this is the same time period used in Section 4. 
25   We also include in the regression  some country dummies to capture any additional country-specific 
effect at the aggregate level. We would like to include dummies for all the countries, but this is not feasible 
because it would lead to perfect multicolinearity. Therefore, we chose to include the largest set of country 
dummies that does not generate multicolinearity with the macroeconomic variables. We end up including country 
variables for Brazil, Mexico and Peru.   
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growth rate in the pre-crisis period (2007), to take into account the credit cycle of each bank, 
and other bank-specific characteristics such as foreign ownership (where foreign banks are 
defined as those banks with foreign ownership larger than 50%). 
According to the Breusch-Pagan test (Table 6), we found evidence of heteroskedasticity in 
the  ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for some regressors  and for the  benchmark 
equation  in  general.  We  correct  the  heteroskedasticity  by  two  methods:  through 
heteroskedasticity-robust  standard  errors  and  cluster-robust  standard  errors  considering 
country as the cluster.26 The former method uses an estimate of the standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and the latter uses clusters or groups of errors that are correlated 
within their cluster or group. 
Table 6: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity1 
  d.f.  Equation number 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 


























Variable    Breusch-Pagan (p-value) 
Lagged real 
credit growth  1  7.66  7.78  7.70  7.58  7.72  7.65 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Foreign  1  9.36  9.18  9.34  9.59  9.22  9.40 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  1  31.10  31.63  31.40  30.94  31.29  31.04 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  1  4.39  4.42  4.47  4.51  4.36  4.40 
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Peru dummy  1  4.42  4.44  4.45  4.46  4.42  4.43 
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
X  1  13.49  13.65  13.28  12.93  13.75  13.41 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Capitalization  1  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.11 
    (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.75)  (0.74)  (0.74) 
Liquidity  1  46.53  47.36  46.40  45.20  47.17  46.32 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  1  12.13  10.94  5.60  1.11  4.88  19.45 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.29)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
Simultaneous  9  92.02  92.82  91.77  90.63  92.77  91.78 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
1 Applied over benchmark equation; 2007 values. H0: constant variance. 
                                                       
26   For a definition of both, see Cameron and Trivedi (2009), pp 82-83.  
28 
 
Another potential econometric problem is the endogeneity of the regressors, which would 
derive into inconsistent estimates of the coefficients. We use the Wu-Hausman test to test 
for endogeneity of the bank-specific regressors (Table 7). The p-values of this test (last 
column of Table 7) show that it was possible to reject the endogeneity of the financial 
soundness variables in the regression but not for the initial credit growth rate. We address 
the  endogeneity  of  this  regressor  with  instrumental  variables  (IV)  estimation.  The 
instruments chosen were the one period lagged (2006) real credit growth rate and financial 
soundness  variables.  Moreover,  as  a  measure  of  fit  for  the  IV  estimation  we  use  the 
generalized R2 criterion as suggested by Pesaran and Smith (1994) 
5.2. Data 
The econometric exercise is restricted to private banks, defined as those with more than 
50% of non-government ownership, in the six Latin American countries in the sample. We 
use bank-specific information from 2006 to 2009 from Bankscope.27 From a total sample of 
269 banks, we were able to work with a sample of 124 banks after eliminating observations 
with missing variables. Brazil is the country with the largest number of banks in our sample 
(60), followed by Argentina (18), Mexico (17), Chile (15), Colombia (10) and Peru (9). There 
were 47 foreign banks in the sample.  
The specific definition of the financial soundness variables used was chosen considering the 
largest set available and its significance in the regression . For  capitalization, the ratio of 
equity to total assets  was selected (Bankscope code 4009); for liquidity, we used the total 
deposits and borrowing to net loans ratio (Bankscope code 4034); for efficiency, the cost to 
income ratio was used (Bankscope code 4029). Also, for our robustness exercise we included 
a profitability ratio measured by the return on average assets (ROAA, Bankscope code 4024) 
and the ratio of loan loss provisioning to impaired performing loans (Bankscope code 4003). 
The definition of the financial soundness variables used in this section is very similar to the 
ones used in the previous section for the aggregate analysis, with the exception of liquidity 
and capitalization.28 For these variables we previously used the bank deposits to bank credit 
ratio and the bank capital to total assets ratio , which  are slightly different definitions of 
liquidity and capitalization, respectively.  
                                                       
27   Data from 2006 are needed to calculate the annual rate of growth of real credit in 2007 and as 
instruments for the IV estimation. 
28   The liquidity ratio used in the econometric analysis also includes other forms of financing than 
deposits. Among Bankscope variables, this definition of liquidity was the closest to the variable used for th e 
aggregate analysis in Section 4. In the case of capitalization, we use the equity to capital ratio instead of the capital 
to assets ratio because of the limited availability of the latter variable in the Bankscope database, in particular for 
banks from Argentina and Colombia.   
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Table 7: Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity1 
Instrumented 
variable  Instruments  Variable ‘X’ 
Error 
correction  d.f. 
Wu-
Hausma











13.40  0.00 
Robust  6.42  0.01 
Total external debt / 
GDP (-1) 
No 
correction  13.21  0.00 
Robust  6.38  0.01 
Short-term external 




correction  13.12  0.00 
Robust  6.52  0.01 
Current account 
balance / GDP 
No 
correction  13.13  0.00 
Robust  6.67  0.01 
Mismatch ratio (-1) 
No 
correction  13.45  0.00 





correction  13.38  0.00 
Robust  6.45  0.01 
Camel,2 2007  Camel,2 
2006 
General government 




1.27  0.29 
Robust  1.32  0.27 
Total external debt / 
GDP (-1) 
No 
correction  1.25  0.29 
Robust  1.35  0.26 
Short-term external 




correction  1.28  0.29 
Robust  1.36  0.26 
Current account 
balance / GDP 
No 
correction  1.31  0.28 
Robust  1.36  0.26 
Mismatch ratio (-1) 
No 
correction  1.25  0.29 





correction  1.27  0.29 
Robust  1.32  0.27 
1 Applied over benchmark model. H0: variables are exogenous. 2 “Camel” comprises the following: capitalization, 




5.3. Results  
Table  8  shows  the  estimation  of  the  benchmark  regression.  As  explained  above,  each 
column  shows  a  regression  including  one  of  each  macroeconomic  variable  at  a  time. 
Moreover, as in Table 2, some of the macroeconomic variables have been multiplied by -1, 
in such a way that a larger value implies better macroeconomic performance.29 Therefore, 
the expected sign for the coefficients of each macroeconomic variable is positive. Given the 
econometric problems of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity of regressors reported above, 
we  estimate  the  benchmark  regression  with  instrumental  variables  correcting  for 
heteroskedasticity by cluster-robust standard errors.30  
A key result from this benchmark regression is that the macroeconomic variables that were 
most important in explaining the evolution of real credit growth during the crisis were the 
currency mismatch ratio, the ratio of total external debt to GDP and the ratio of short-term 
external debt to gross international reserves. All of these variables are related to the 
economy’s  capacity  to  withstand  an  external  financial  shock.  Somewhat  less  statistically 
significant were the government fiscal balance to GDP and the financial-pressures-adjusted 
monetary variable,31 which are related to the capacity to implement policies affecting the 
performance of real credit in Latin American banks during the crisis. On the other hand, the 
current account to GDP ratio did not show a significant effect on the evolution of credit in 
these countries. 
Most  of  these  results  are  in  line  with  those  found  in  the  previous  section.  The 
macroeconomic solvency indicator measured by the ratio of total external debt to GDP and 
the mismatch ratio were highly important in both analyses to explain the evolution of credit 
during the crisis. However, there are also some differences. In the country -level analysis the 
current account to GDP ratio seemed to play a more important role, but this variable is not 
statistically significant in the bank -level study. This result suggests that this indicator of 
external financing needs at the time of the shock was more important in explaining the 
differences across regions than differen ces within Latin American countries. Similarly, the 
ratio of short-term external debt to gross international reserves showed a low correlation 
                                                       
29   Those variables that were multiplied by -1 were total external debt to GDP, short-term debt to gross 
international reserves and the mismatch ratio.  
30   Also, Tables A3 to A8 in Appendix III show regressions of the benchmark equation estimated using 
alternative methods, such as OLS estimation, without correction of heteroskedasticy (BEN), robust standard 
error correction (HET) and cluster-robust standard error correction (CLU), and IV estimation using the same 
three strategies to deal with heteroskedasticity. The signs of the coefficients do not change when we correct for 
the endogeneity of the regressors; however, significance is affected when we correct for heteroskedasticity.  IV-
CLU is the regression that shows the largest significance of regressors (last column). 
31   The significance of these variables is considerable less than the previous ones, the p-values are 
respectively 0.07 and 0.16.  
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with the change of credit growth at the aggregate level, but this measure of external liquidity 
was highly statistically significant at the micro level for Latin America.  
Table 8: Regression results: benchmark equation1 































Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -2.65  -2.63  -2.62  -2.62  -2.65  -2.64 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -49.96  -49.14  -48.41  -48.11  -50.36  -49.79 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  60.55  38.97  44.11  54.04  50.38  61.30 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  52.37  34.49  38.09  46.09  42.38  50.57 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  32.69  28.83  22.45  32.63  34.70  32.58 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
X  0.92  0.80  0.35  -1.02  0.13  0.15 
   (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.45)  (0.00)  (0.16) 
Capitalization  2.63  2.68  2.66  2.62  2.64  2.62 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant  7.86  37.60  29.38  10.91  23.31  7.81 
   (0.56)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.38)  (0.04)  (0.57) 
N  129  129  129  129  129  129 
R22  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; estimation method: instrumental 
variables (two stage least squares); instrumented variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real 
credit growth; regressors: 2007 values; standard error correction: cluster (cluster variable is country). 2 
Generalized R2. 
 
Moreover, as in the country-level analysis, the financial  soundness characteristics of Latin 
American banks played a role on the evolution of credit during the crisis. In particular, the 
large coefficient of capitalization (larger than 2 in all regressions) indicates that  the better  
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capitalized banks were before the crisis, the more able they were to withstand the adverse 
effects of the crisis. Also, more liquid banks, measured by a greater dependence on local 
deposits as a funding source (and consequently lower dependence on external sources of 
funding), and more efficient banks (that is, those that incurred in lower costs from running 
the business), were able to cope better with the effects of the crisis on credit.  
Furthermore, the negative sign of the lagged real credit growth regressor shows that banks 
that were facing larger growth rates of credit prior to the crisis were also those who suffered 
more in terms of credit contraction. Also,  the negative sign of the foreign-owned bank 
variable indicates that this type of banks also performed worse than domestic banks during 
the crisis in terms of credit provision, after controlling for other factors. This last result is 
consistent with Galindo et al (2010), who find that in the years prior to the crisis foreign-
owned banks in Latin America responded more than domestically owned banks to external 
financial shocks in terms of the supply of credit. 
Robustness analysis to the benchmark equation is presented in Table 9. To this end, we 
included  other  controls  such  as  the  size  of  the  bank  and  other  financial  soundness 
characteristics,  such  as  provisioning  and  profitability.  The  relative  size  of  each  bank  is 
measured  by  the  share  of  capital  in  its  respective  national  system.  The  indicator  of 
provisioning was measured by the loan loss reserves to impaired loans ratio (Bankscope code 
4003),  and  the  indicator  of  profitability  was  measured  by  the  return  on  average  assets 
(Bankscope code 4024). 
The  first  column  of  Table  9  shows  the  regression  after  replacing  the  macroeconomic 
variables with a full set of country dummies. We found a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient  for  Brazil,  Mexico  and  Peru,  which  indicates  that  these  countries  had  an 
important country-specific effect in the performance of credit. However, the coefficients for 
Argentina and Chile were not statistically significant at the 10% level, which indicates that, 
after controlling for other factors, there was not a significant country-specific effect for these 
countries.  Also,  in  columns  2  to  7  we  repeat  the  benchmark  regressions,  including  the 
additional controls mentioned above. As shown, none of the new controls was statistically 
significant  at  the  10%  level,  and  none  of  the  main  results  presented  in  the  benchmark 
regression  changed  qualitatively.  That  is,  the  size  of  the  banks  and  their  levels  of 
provisioning  and  profitability  previous  to  the  crisis  did  not  appear  to  have  a  role  in 




Table 9: Regression results: robustness analysis1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 




























Variable    Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -2.67  -2.68  -2.67  -2.68  -2.69  -2.67  -2.68 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Size  -83.74  -66.95  -79.84  -73.25  -61.56  -72.75  -65.20 
   (0.32)  (0.43)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.47)  (0.38)  (0.44) 
Foreign  -48.90  -49.35  -47.86  -47.31  -47.35  -49.64  -49.20 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Argentina dummy  -1.73             
   (0.92)             
Brazil dummy  63.42  59.29  31.94  39.97  53.01  42.93  60.87 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Chile dummy  20.13             
   (0.20)             
Colombia dummy  22.98             
   (0.09)             
Mexico dummy  61.72  54.65  31.52  36.62  46.66  39.26  51.97 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  49.30  34.64  30.60  22.81  34.76  37.90  34.41 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
X    1.42  0.99  0.43  -1.21  0.20  0.24 
     (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.60)  (0.00)  (0.19) 
Capitalization  2.57  2.54  2.59  2.60  2.58  2.54  2.54 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.12  0.12 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Profitability  1.19  1.17  1.13  1.08  1.04  1.20  1.15 
   (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.30)  (0.34)  (0.23)  (0.26) 
Provisioning  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.00 
  (0.91)  (0.90)  (0.93)  (0.82)  (0.82)  (0.84)  (0.93) 
Constant    9.92  47.16  35.32  12.01  33.97  9.56 
     (0.54)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.48)  (0.01)  (0.56) 
N  129  129  129  129  129  129  129 
R22  0.36  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; estimation method: instrumental variables (two 
stage least squares); instrumented variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth; regressors: 




Real credit growth in emerging market economies is vulnerable to adverse effects of external 
financial shocks. The global crisis of 2008-09 was a case in point. However, policymakers 
from emerging markets do not have to be (and many have not been) bystanders to the 
vagaries of international capital markets. It is the quality of pre-crisis credit growth (which 
preserved healthy balance sheets) that matters as much as its rate of expansion. Analysis at 
the country and bank levels shows that initial conditions, determined by the actions of local 
public and private sector participants, in the period before the crisis mattered for the behavior 
of real credit growth during the crisis. 
The results at the country level strongly suggest that pre-crisis balance sheet indicators of 
macroeconomic performance and the strength of the financial system were closely associated 
with the resilience of real credit growth during the crisis. In particular, real credit growth 
resilience during the crisis was higher in the countries that faced the beginning of the crisis 
with lower external financing needs (relative to GDP), had lower currency mismatches both 
in private and public balance sheets, and were well placed to implement  countercyclical 
monetary policies and  to provide liquidity without generating macroeconomic instability. 
These results underscore the important limitations faced by emerging market economies due 
to their inability to issue hard currency. While, in general, it is not a good idea to have a large 
amount  of  liabilities  denominated  in  currencies  that  a  country  cannot  issue,  this  is 
particularly critical in the presence of an external shock that dries up hard-currency liquidity. 
Analysis of data at the bank level for a set of Latin American countries reinforces a number 
of the results obtained at the aggregate level. In particular, the economy’s overall currency 
mismatch was a significant variable in the econometric exercise conducted at the micro level. 
External debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short-term debt) were also significant 
variables  in  the  real  credit  growth  equations  of  Latin  American  banks.  The  capacity  to 
implement countercyclical policies during the crisis  was also important in explaining the 
behavior of bank credit, albeit at a lower level of significance. The policy implication is that 
macroprudential policies which limit both currency mismatches and external debt to ensure 
sustainable forms of credit expansion are absolutely central. Moreover, financial soundness 
characteristics of Latin American banks also played a role in explaining the dynamics of real 
credit  during  the  crisis.  In  particular,  higher  ratios  of  capitalization,  liquidity  and  bank 
efficiency were factors that helped banks to better cope with the effects of the crisis on 
credit. We also found that foreign banks and banks which had expanded credit growth more 
before the crisis were also those that cut credit most. 
As additional data become available, the analysis in this paper can be useful for assessing 
how emerging market economies, in general, and Latin American countries, in particular, are 
preparing themselves to cope with the adverse effects on real credit growth of an increase in 
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Appendix I: Constructing the regulatory strength variables 
The  two  variables  included  in  the  analysis  –  (i)  overall  activities  and  bank  ownership 
restrictions and (ii) accounting and transparency – were constructed by assigning specific 
scores to the answers from a survey conducted by the World Bank using the Berth et al 
(2007) questionnaire. The value of each variable for every country is the average of the 
assigned scores. 
All the answers to the World Bank survey can be found at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,cont
entMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
This appendix presents the survey questions used and the scores assigned to construct the 
two regulatory strength variables 
A.  Accounting and transparency 
Question 
no in the 
survey 
Question in the survey  Possible answers  Assigned scores 
3.10  Are accounting practices for 





1 if the answer is 
YES  
0 if the answer is 
NO 
3.11  Are accounting practices for 
banks in accordance with US 




1 if the answer is 
YES 
0 if the answer is 
NO 
10.1  Does accrued, though unpaid 
interest/principal enter the 
income statement while the loan 
is still performing? 
 YES 
 NO 
 Not Available 
1 is the answer is 
YES 
0 if the Answer is 
No or Not Available 
10.1.1  Does accrues, though unpaid 
interest/principal enter the 
income statement while the loan 
is still non-performing? 
 YES 
 NO 
 Not Available 
1 if the answer is 
NO 
0 if the answer is 
YES or Not 
available 
10.3  Are financial institutions required 
to produce consolidated 
accounts covering all banks and 
any nonbank financial subsidiary? 
 YES 
 NO 
 Not Available 
1 is the answer is 
YES 
0 if the Answer is 
No or Not Available 
10.5  Must banks disclose their risk 




 Not Available 
1 is the answer is 
YES 
0 if the Answer is 







B.  Overall activities and bank ownership restrictions 
Question 
no in the 
survey 
Question in the survey  Possible answers  Assigned scores 
4.1  What are the conditions 
under which banks can 
engage in security 
activities 
1. Unrestricted: A full range of activities can 
be conducted indirectly in banks 
2. Permitted: A full range of these activities 
are offered, but all or some of these activities 
must be conducted in subsidiaries or in 
another part of a common holding. 
3. Restricted: Less than a full range of 
activities can be conducted in the bank or 
subsidiary. 
4. Prohibited: The activity cannot be 
conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries 
Unrestricted = 1 
Permitted = 2 
Restricted = 3 
Prohibited = 4 
4.2  What are the conditions 
under which banks can 
engage in insurance 
activities? 
1. Unrestricted: A full range of activities can 
be conducted indirectly in banks 
2. Permitted: A full range of these activities 
are offered, but all or some of these activities 
must be conducted in subsidiaries or in 
another part of a common holding. 
3. Restricted: Less than a full range of 
activities can be conducted in the bank or 
subsidiary. 
4. Prohibited: The activity cannot be 
conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries 
Unrestricted = 1 
Permitted = 2 
Restricted = 3 
Prohibited = 4 
4.3  What are the conditions 
under which banks can 
engage in real estate 
activities? 
1. Unrestricted: A full range of activities can 
be conducted indirectly in banks 
2. Permitted: A full range of these activities 
are offered, but all or some of these activities 
must be conducted in subsidiaries or in 
another part of a common holding. 
3. Restricted: Less than a full range of 
activities can be conducted in the bank or 
subsidiary. 
4. Prohibited: The activity cannot be 
conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries 
Unrestricted = 1 
Permitted = 2 
Restricted = 3 
Prohibited = 4 
4.4  Can banks own voting 
shares in non-financial 
firms? 
1. Unrestricted: A bank might own 100%of 
the equity in any non-financial firm. 
2. Permitted: A bank might own 100% of the 
equity in a non-financial firm, but ownership 
is limited based on the bank’s equity capital. 
3. Restricted: A bank can only acquire less 
than 100% of the equity in a non-financial 
firm. 
4. Restricted: A bank might not acquire any 
equity investment in a non-financial firm 
whatsoever.  
Unrestricted = 1 
Permitted = 2 
Restricted = 3 




Appendix II: Values of the real credit growth and financial-
pressures-adjusted monetary variables 
 
Table A1: Real credit growth during the crisis 







Latin America       
Argentina  -24.5  -0.4  15 
Brazil  -33.9  -1.0  19 
Chile  -14.5  0.2  8 
Colombia   -24.8  -0.4  16 
Mexico  -14.6  0.2  9 
Peru  -20.4  -0.2  14 
Emerging Asia        
China  20.5  2.4  1 
Chinese Taipei  2.5  1.3  2 
India  -10.9  0.4  7 
Indonesia  -15.1  0.2  10 
Korea  -9.8  0.5  6 
Malaysia  -2.8  0.9  4 
Philippines  -2.9  0.9  5 
Thailand  -1.0  1.0  3 
Emerging 
Europe       
Bulgaria  -39.1  -1.3  20 
Czech Republic  -18.9  -0.1  13 
Estonia  -26.1  -0.5  17 
Hungary  -17.1  0.0  11 
Latvia  -26.7  -0.5  18 
Lithuania  -41.2  -1.4  21 
Poland  -17.2  0.0  12 
Romania  -53.0  -2.2  22 
1 Difference in year over year percentage change for Q4 2009 
and Q4 2007. 2 Standardized version of the average of the 
variables shown. 





















(1)  (2) 
(3) = (1) X 
(2)  (4)  (5) 
Latin America           
Argentina  -3.0  2.5  -7.5  0.0  15 
Brazil  -2.4  8.5  -20.5  -0.1  17 
Chile  -5.8  -8.0  46.3  0.7  5 
Colombia   -2.4  2.8  -6.6  0.0  14 
Mexico  -3.5  -1.2  4.2  0.2  11 
Peru  -3.9  -5.1  20.1  0.4  9 
Emerging Asia           
China  -4.2  -9.4  39.6  0.6  6 
Chinese Taipei  -3.6  -20.3  73.1  1.1  2 
India  -0.6  -4.9  2.8  0.2  13 
Indonesia  -3.3  -10.6  35.3  0.6  7 
Korea  -0.4  -10.4  3.9  0.2  12 
Malaysia  -1.7  -15.2  26.5  0.5  8 
Philippines  -3.0  -18.5  55.6  0.8  3 




       
Bulgaria  -6.9  14.0  -95.7  -1.1  20 
Czech 
Republic  -4.2  -2.8  11.9  0.3  10 
Estonia  -8.7  8.1  -70.6  -0.8  18 
Hungary  -5.0  -21.2  106.6  1.5  1 
Latvia  -13.0  14.4  -187.3  -2.3  21 
Lithuania  -8.1  10.9  -88.2  -1.0  19 
Poland  -4.8  3.6  -17.5  -0.1  16 
Romania  -6.5  30.4  -198.1  -2.5  22 
           
1 2007 real credit average growth rate minus 22%; based on quarterly data. 2 Standardized version of 
column (3) shown. 




Appendix III: Alternative methods for estimating the 
benchmark regression 
 
Table A3: Regression results: benchmark equation using general government fiscal balance / 
GDP1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation method  OLS  IV 2SLS2 
Error correction 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -1.01  -1.01  -1.01  -2.65  -2.65  -2.65 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -19.94  -19.94  -19.94  -49.96  -49.96  -49.96 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  25.59  25.59  25.59  60.55  60.55  60.55 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  11.31  11.31  11.31  52.37  52.37  52.37 
   (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.22)  (0.30)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  15.64  15.64  15.64  32.69  32.69  32.69 
   (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.38)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
General 
government fiscal 
balance / GDP  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.92  0.92  0.92 
   (0.51)  (0.30)  (0.14)  (0.75)  (0.57)  (0.07) 
Capitalization  0.57  0.57  0.57  2.63  2.63  2.63 
   (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.10  0.10  0.10 
   (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.71)  (0.39)  (0.00) 
Constant  -23.14  -23.14  -23.14  7.86  7.86  7.86 
   (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.80)  (0.66)  (0.56) 
N  139  139  139  129  129  129 
R24  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; regressors: 2007 values. 2 Instrumented 
variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth. 3 Cluster variable is country. 4 For IV 





Table A4: Regression results: benchmark equation using total external debt / GDP1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation method  OLS  IV 2SLS2 
Error correction 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -1.01  -1.01  -1.01  -2.63  -2.63  -2.63 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -19.52  -19.52  -19.52  -49.14  -49.14  -49.14 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  10.90  10.90  10.90  38.97  38.97  38.97 
   (0.43)  (0.16)  (0.02)  (0.34)  (0.12)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  -0.75  -0.75  -0.75  34.49  34.49  34.49 
   (0.96)  (0.92)  (0.79)  (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  13.24  13.24  13.24  28.83  28.83  28.83 
   (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.43)  (0.09)  (0.00) 
Total external debt 
/ GDP (-1)  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.80  0.80  0.80 
   (0.32)  (0.10)  (0.01)  (0.57)  (0.29)  (0.00) 
Capitalization  0.61  0.61  0.61  2.68  2.68  2.68 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.10  0.10  0.10 
   (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.70)  (0.36)  (0.00) 
Constant  -2.98  -2.98  -2.98  37.60  37.60  37.60 
   (0.89)  (0.81)  (0.61)  (0.54)  (0.25)  (0.00) 
N  139  139  139  129  129  129 
R24  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; regressors: 2007 values. 2 Instrumented 
variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth. 3 Cluster variable is country. 4 For IV 





Table A5: Regression results: benchmark equation using short-term external debt / gross 
international reserves1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation method  OLS  IV 2SLS2 
Error correction 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -1.01  -1.01  -1.01  -2.62  -2.62  -2.62 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -19.15  -19.15  -19.15  -48.41  -48.41  -48.41 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  14.66  14.66  14.66  44.11  44.11  44.11 
   (0.22)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.25)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  2.02  2.02  2.02  38.09  38.09  38.09 
   (0.88)  (0.76)  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.41)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  9.40  9.40  9.40  22.45  22.45  22.45 
   (0.56)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.59)  (0.20)  (0.00) 
Short-term external 
debt / gross 
international 
reserves 
(-1)   0.23  0.23  0.23  0.35  0.35  0.35 
   (0.43)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.63)  (0.32)  (0.01) 
Capitalization  0.60  0.60  0.60  2.66  2.66  2.66 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.09  0.09  0.09 
   (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.71)  (0.37)  (0.00) 
Constant  -8.77  -8.77  -8.77  29.38  29.38  29.38 
   (0.64)  (0.44)  (0.06)  (0.59)  (0.27)  (0.00) 
N  139  139  139  129  129  129 
R24  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; regressors: 2007 values. 2 Instrumented 
variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth. 3 Cluster variable is country. 4 For IV 





Table A6: Regression results: benchmark equation using current account balance / GDP1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation method  OLS  IV 2SLS2 
Error correction 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -1.01  -1.01  -1.01  -2.62  -2.62  -2.62 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -18.99  -18.99  -18.99  -48.11  -48.11  -48.11 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  21.43  21.43  21.43  54.04  54.04  54.04 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  7.70  7.70  7.70  46.09  46.09  46.09 
   (0.50)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.34)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  16.17  16.17  16.17  32.63  32.63  32.63 
   (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.37)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Current account 
balance / GDP  -0.52  -0.52  -0.52  -1.02  -1.02  -1.02 
   (0.79)  (0.53)  (0.66)  (0.84)  (0.65)  (0.45) 
Capitalization  0.58  0.58  0.58  2.62  2.62  2.62 
   (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.09  0.09  0.09 
   (0.00)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.73)  (0.40)  (0.00) 
Constant  -21.06  -21.06  -21.06  10.91  10.91  10.91 
   (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.73)  (0.53)  (0.38) 
N  139  139  139  129  129  129 
R24  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; regressors: 2007 values. 2 Instrumented 
variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth. 3 Cluster variable is country. 4 For IV 




Table A7: Regression results: benchmark equation using the mismatch ratio1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation method  OLS  IV 2SLS2 
Error correction 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -1.01  -1.01  -1.01  -2.65  -2.65  -2.65 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -20.13  -20.13  -20.13  -50.36  -50.36  -50.36 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  17.58  17.58  17.58  50.38  50.38  50.38 
   (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  3.46  3.46  3.46  42.38  42.38  42.38 
   (0.78)  (0.64)  (0.12)  (0.32)  (0.36)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  17.09  17.09  17.09  34.70  34.70  34.70 
   (0.20)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.35)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Mismatch ratio (-1)  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.13  0.13  0.13 
   (0.41)  (0.23)  (0.04)  (0.67)  (0.47)  (0.00) 
Capitalization  0.57  0.57  0.57  2.64  2.64  2.64 
   (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.10  0.10  0.10 
   (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.70)  (0.38)  (0.00) 
Constant  -11.32  -11.32  -11.32  23.31  23.31  23.31 
   (0.47)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.61)  (0.43)  (0.04) 
N  139  139  139  129  129  129 
R24  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; regressors: 2007 values. 2 Instrumented 
variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth. 3 Cluster variable is country. 4 For IV 




Table A8: Regression results: benchmark equation using the financial-pressures-adjusted monetary 
variable1 
Equation number  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Estimation method  OLS  IV 2SLS2 
Error correction 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
No 
correction  Robust  Cluster3 
Variable  Coefficient (p-value) 
Lagged real credit 
growth  -1.01  -1.01  -1.01  -2.64  -2.64  -2.64 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Foreign  -19.86  -19.86  -19.86  -49.79  -49.79  -49.79 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Brazil dummy  26.39  26.39  26.39  61.30  61.30  61.30 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.00) 
Mexico dummy  9.95  9.95  9.95  50.57  50.57  50.57 
   (0.33)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.22)  (0.31)  (0.00) 
Peru dummy  15.57  15.57  15.57  32.58  32.58  32.58 
   (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.38)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
Financial-pressures-
adjusted monetary 
variable  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.15  0.15  0.15 
   (0.56)  (0.34)  (0.21)  (0.78)  (0.61)  (0.16) 
Capitalization  0.57  0.57  0.57  2.62  2.62  2.62 
   (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Liquidity  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Efficiency  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.10  0.10  0.10 
   (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.71)  (0.39)  (0.00) 
Constant  -23.25  -23.25  -23.25  7.81  7.81  7.81 
   (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.80)  (0.66)  (0.57) 
N  139  139  139  129  129  129 
R24  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.20  0.20  0.20 
1 Dependent variable: change in real credit growth during the crisis; regressors: 2007 values. 2 Instrumented 
variable: 2007 real credit growth; instrument: 2006 real credit growth. 3 Cluster variable is country. 4 For IV 
estimations, generalised R2. 
 
 